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Visions, Values, Valuation,
and the Need for an
Ecological Economics
ROBERT COSTANZA

P

ractical problem solving in complex, humandominated ecosystems requires the integration of three
elements: (1) active and ongoing envisioning of both how the
world works and how we would like the world to be, (2) systematic analysis appropriate to and consistent with the vision,
and (3) implementation appropriate to the vision. Scientists
generally focus on only the second of these steps, but integrating all three is essential to both good science and effective
management. Subjective values enter in the vision element,
both in terms of the formation of broad social goals and in
the creation of a preanalytic vision, which necessarily precedes
any form of scientific analysis.
Because of this need for vision, completely objective scientific analysis is impossible. Joseph Schumpeter (1954) put
it this way:
In practice we all start our own research from the work
of our predecessors, that is, we hardly ever start from
scratch. But suppose we did start from scratch, what are
the steps we should have to take? Obviously, in order to
be able to posit to ourselves any problems at all, we
should first have to visualize a distinct set of coherent
phenomena as a worthwhile object of our analytic
effort. In other words, analytic effort is of necessity preceded by a preanalytic cognitive act that supplies the
raw material for the analytic effort. In this book, this
preanalytic cognitive act will be called Vision. It is interesting to note that vision of this kind not only must
precede historically the emergence of analytic effort in
any field, but also may reenter the history of every
established science each time somebody teaches us to
see things in a light of which the source is not to be
found in the facts, methods, and results of the preexisting state of the science. (p. 41)

Nevertheless, it is possible to separate the process into the
more subjective, or normative, envisioning component and
the more systematic, less subjective analysis component
(which is based on the vision). “Good” science is that which
makes clear its underlying preanalytic vision, and whose
analysis is consistent with that vision.

ALL SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS IS BASED ON A
“PREANALYTIC VISION,” AND THE MAJOR
SOURCE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT
CURRENT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
RESULTS FROM DIFFERENCES IN VISIONS
AND WORLD VIEWS

A changing vision of science
The task would be simpler if the vision of science were static
and unchanging. But as the quote from Schumpeter makes
clear, this vision is itself evolving as we learn more. This does
not invalidate science, as some deconstructionists would have
it. Quite the contrary: By being explicit about their underlying preanalytic vision, scientists can enhance their honesty and
thereby their credibility. Scientific credibility proceeds from
honest discussion of this underlying vision and its inherently subjective elements, as well as from constant, pragmatic
testing of conclusions against real-world problems, rather
than by appealing to a nonexistent objectivity.
The preanalytic vision of science is changing from the
“logical positivist” view, which holds that science can discover
ultimate truth by falsification of hypotheses, to the more
pragmatic view that we do not have access to any ultimate, universal truths, but only to useful, abstract representations
(models) of small parts of the world. Science, in both the logical positivist and this new “pragmatic modeling” vision,
works by building models and testing them. But the new
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vision recognizes that the tests are rarely, if ever, conclusive
(especially in the life sciences and the social sciences); the models can only apply to a limited part of the real world; and the
ultimate goal is therefore not truth, but quality and utility. In
the words of William Deming, “All models are wrong, but
some models are useful” (McCoy 1994).
The primary goal of science, then, is the creation of useful models whose utility and quality can be tested against realworld applications. The criteria by which one judges the utility and quality of models are themselves social constructs that
evolve over time. There is, however, fairly broad and consistent consensus in the scientific community about what these
criteria are. They include (1) testability, (2) repeatability, (3)
predictability, and (4) elegance (i.e., Occam’s razor: The
model should be as simple as possible, but no simpler!). But
because of the nature of real-world problems, there are many
applications for which some of these criteria are difficult or
impossible to apply. These applications may nevertheless still
be judged as “good” science. For example, some purely theoretical models are not directly testable, but they may provide
fertile ground for thought and debate and lead to more explicit models that are testable. Likewise, field studies of watersheds are not repeatable, strictly speaking, because no two
watersheds are identical. But there is much we can learn from
field studies that can be applied to other watersheds and
tested against the other criteria of predictability and elegance. How simple a model can be depends on the questions
being asked. If we ask a more complex or more detailed question, the model will probably have to be more complex and
detailed. As science progresses and the range of applications
expands, the criteria by which utility and quality are judged
must also adapt to the changing applications. This inherently subjective process goes on constantly within the scientific community.

Vision and change
Research concerning the way change proceeds in various organizations and communities suggests that the most effective
ingredient to move change in a particular direction is a clear,
shared vision of the desired goal (Senge 1990, Wiesbord
1992, Wiesbord and Janoff 1995). Or, as Yogi Berra once
said, “If you don’t know where you’re going, you end up
somewhere else.”
Yankelovich (1991) has described the crisis in governance
facing modern societies as one of moving from public opinion to public judgment. Public opinion is notoriously fickle
and inconsistent on those issues for which the public has
not confronted the system-level implications of its opinions.
Coming to judgment requires three steps: (1) consciousness
raising, (2) working through, and (3) resolution.A prerequisite
for all three of these steps is breaking down the gap between
expert knowledge and the public, that is, a breaking down of
what Yankelovich (1991, citing Habermas 1991) calls the
“culture of technical control.” Information in the modern
world is compartmentalized and controlled by various technical elites who do not communicate with each other. This al460 BioScience  June 2001 / Vol. 51 No. 6

lows experts from various fields to hold contradictory opinions, and it allows the public to hold inconsistent and volatile
opinions. Coming to judgment is the process of confronting
and resolving these inconsistencies by breaking down the
barriers between the mutually exclusive compartments into
which knowledge and information have been put. For example, opinion polls show many people are highly in favor
of more effort to protect the environment, but at the same time
they are opposed to any diversion of tax revenues for that purpose. Coming to judgment is the process of resolving these
conflicts. This can be done most effectively by formulating the
choices as complete visions of the alternative states of the
world, and incorporating all the divergent elements.

Visions of the economy and its
relationship to the ecological life
support system
Both our preanalytic vision of how the human economy relates to the rest of nature and the economy itself are also
changing. The human economy has passed from an “emptyworld” era, in which human-made capital was the limiting factor in economic development, to the current “full-world”
era, in which remaining natural capital has become the limiting factor (Costanza et al. 1997). Basic economic logic tells
us that we should maximize the productivity of the scarcest
(limiting) factor, as well as try to increase its supply. This means
that economic policy should be designed to increase the productivity of natural capital and its total amount, rather than
to increase the productivity of human-made capital and its
accumulation, as was appropriate when it was limiting. This
implies a very different vision of the economy and its place
in the overall system.
Figure 1a shows the conventional economic preanalytic vision (Costanza et al. 1997). The primary factors of production (land, labor, and capital) combine in the economic
process to produce goods and services, usually measured as
gross national product (GNP). GNP is divided into consumption, which is the sole contributor to individual utility
and welfare, and investment, which goes into maintaining and
increasing the capital stocks. Preferences are fixed. In this
model, the primary factors are perfect substitutes for each
other, so “land” (including ecosystem services) can be almost ignored, and the lines between all the forms of capital
are fuzzy. Property rights are usually simplified to either private or public, and their distribution is usually taken as fixed
and given.
Figure 1b shows an alternative “ecological economics”
view of the process (Ekins 1992, Costanza et al. 1997). Notice
that the key elements of the conventional view are still present, but more has been added and some priorities have
changed. There is limited substitutability between the basic
forms of capital in this model, and their number has expanded to four. Their names have also changed to better reflect their roles: (1) natural capital (formerly land) includes
ecological systems, mineral deposits, and other aspects of
the natural world; (2) human capital (formerly labor) includes
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Figure 1. Different visions of the economy based on disparate world views. Conventional economics model (a) and expanded
ecological economics model (b).
both the physical labor of humans and the know-how stored
in their brains; (3) manufactured capital still includes all the
machines and other infrastructure of the human economy;
and (4) social (or cultural) capital. Social capital is a recent
concept that includes the web of interpersonal connections,
institutional arrangements, rules, and norms that allows individual human interactions to occur (Berkes and Folke
1994). Property rights regimes in this model are complex
and flexible, spanning the range from individual to common to public property. Natural capital captures solar energy

and behaves as an autonomous complex system, and the
model conforms to the basic laws of thermodynamics. Natural capital contributes to the production of marketed economic goods and services, which affect human welfare. It also
produces ecological services and amenities that directly contribute to human welfare without ever passing through markets. The model also accounts for waste production by the economic process, which contributes negatively to human welfare
and has a negative impact on capital and ecological services.
Personal preferences are adapting and changing, but basic huJune 2001 / Vol. 51 No. 6  BioScience 461
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man needs are constant. Human welfare is a function of
much more than the consumption of economic goods and services.
These visions of the world are significantly different. As
Ekins (1992) points out, “It must be stressed that the complexities and feedbacks of model 2 are not simply glosses on
model 1’s simpler portrayal of reality. They fundamentally alter the perceived nature of that reality and in ignoring them
conventional analysis produces serious errors” (p. 151).

Valuation and social goals
Valuation ultimately refers to the contribution of an item
to meeting a specific goal or objective. A baseball player is
valuable to the extent he contributes to the goal of the
team’s winning. In ecology, a gene is valuable to the extent
it contributes to the survival of the individuals possessing
it and their progeny. In conventional economics, a commodity is valuable to the extent it contributes to the goal
of individual welfare, as assessed by individuals’ willingness
to pay. The point is that one cannot state a value without
stating the goal being served. Conventional economic value
is based on the goal of individual utility maximization. But
other goals, and thus other values, are possible. For example,
if the goal is sustainability, one should assess value based
on the contribution to achieving that goal, in addition to
value based on the goals of individual utility maximization,
social equity, or other goals that may be deemed important.
This broadening is particularly important if the goals are
potentially in conflict.
There are at least three broad goals that have been identified as important to managing economic systems within the
context of the planet’s ecological life support system (Daly
1992):
1. assessing and ensuring that the scale or magnitude of
human activities within the biosphere is ecologically
sustainable
2. distributing resources and property rights fairly, both
within the current generation of humans and between
this and future generations, and also between humans
and other species
3. efficiently allocating resources, as constrained and
defined by the two goals above, including both marketed and nonmarketed resources, especially ecosystem
services

Several authors have discussed valuation of ecosystem services with respect to the third goal, allocative efficiency, based
on individual utility maximization (e.g., Farber and Costanza
1987, Costanza et. al. 1989, Mitchell and Carson 1989, Dixon
and Hufschmidt 1990, Pearce 1993, Goulder and Kennedy
1997). We need to explore more fully the implications of extending these concepts to include valuation with respect to the
other two goals: ecological sustainability and distributional
fairness (Costanza and Folke 1997). Basing valuation on current individual preferences and utility maximization alone, as
462 BioScience  June 2001 / Vol. 51 No. 6

is done in conventional analysis, does not necessarily lead to
ecological sustainability or social fairness (Bishop 1993).
A Kantian or intrinsic rights approach to valuation (see
Goulder and Kennedy 1997)—which holds that things have
value without any reference to their uses—is one approach to
distributional fairness, but it is important to recognize that the
three goals are not either–or alternatives. Although they are
in some senses independent criteria (Arrow and Raynaud
1986), they must all be satisfied in an integrated fashion to allow human life to continue in a desirable way. Similarly, the
valuations that flow from these goals are not either–or alternatives. Rather than resort to a utilitarian or intrinsic rights
dichotomy, we must integrate the three goals listed above
and their consequent valuations.
A two-tiered approach that combines (1) public discussion
and consensus building on sustainability and fairness goals at
the community level with (2) methods for modifying both
prices and preferences at the individual level to better reflect
these community goals may be necessary (Rawls 1971, Norton 1995, Norton et al. 1998). Another consequence of valuing ecosystems based on sustainability and fairness goals is that
personal preferences must be treated as endogenous and coevolving with other ecological, economic, and social variables.

Valuation with sustainability, fairness,
and efficiency as goals
With these goals in mind, we can distinguish at least three types
of value that, when taken into account, should advance our
valuation of ecosystem services. These are laid out in Table 1
according to their corresponding goal or value basis. The
first, efficiency-based value (E-value), is based on a model of
human behavior sometimes referred to as “Homo economius,”
in which humans act independently, rationally, and in their
own self-interest. Value in this context (E-value) is based on
current individual preferences, which are assumed to be fixed
or given (Norton et al. 1998). No additional discussion or scientific input is required to form these preferences, because
they are assumed to already exist, and value is revealed simply by people’s willingness to pay for the good or service in
question. The best estimate of what people are willing to pay
is thought to be what they would actually pay in a well-functioning market. For resources or services for which there is no
market, like many ecosystem services, a pseudo-market can
sometimes be simulated with questionnaires that elicit individuals’ contingent valuation.
Fairness-based value (F-value) requires that individuals
vote their preferences as members of the community, not as
individuals. This different species, “Homo communicus,” engages in much discussion with other members of the community so the community can come to consensus on the
values that would be fair to all members, including those in
the future community as well as nonhuman species. Discussions incorporate scientific information about possible future
consequences as necessary. One method to implement this
might be Rawls’s (1971) “veil of ignorance,” according to

Articles
Table 1. Valuation of ecosystem services based on the three primary goals of efficiency, fairness, and sustainability.
Goal or
value basis

Who
votes

Preference
basis

Level of
discussion
required

Level of
scientific input
required

Specific
methods

Efficiency
(E-value)

Homo
economius

Current
individual
preferences

Low

Low

Willingness
to pay

Fairness
(F-value)

Homo
communicus

Community
preferences

High

Medium

Veil of
ignorance

Sustainability
(S-value)

Homo
naturalis

Whole system
preferences

Medium

High

Modeling
with
precaution

Source: Costanza and Folke 1997.

which individuals vote as if they were operating with no
knowledge of their own individual status in current or future
society.
Sustainability-based value (S-value) requires an assessment of the contribution to ecological sustainability of the item
in question. The S-value of ecosystem services is connected
to their physical, chemical, and biological role in the long-term
functioning of the global system. Scientific information about
the functioning of the global system is thus critical in assessing S-value, and some discussion and consensus building is
also necessary. If it is accepted that all species, no matter how
seemingly unimportant, have a role to play in natural ecosystems (Naeem et al. 1994, Tilman and Downing 1994, Holling
et al. 1995), then estimates of ecosystem services can be derived from scientific studies of the role of ecosystems and their
biota in the overall system, without direct reference to current
human preferences. Humans operate as “Homo naturalis” in
this context, expressing preferences as if they were representatives of the whole system. Instead of being merely an expression of current individual preferences, S-value becomes
a system characteristic related to the item’s evolutionary contribution to the survival of the whole ecological economic system. By adopting this perspective, we may be able to better estimate the values contributed by, say, maintenance of water
and atmospheric quality to long-term human well-being and
ultimately protect the opportunities of choice for future generations (Golley 1994, Perrings 1994). One way to get at these
values would be to simulate systems using models that incorporate the major linkages in the system at the appropriate time and space scales (Costanza et al. 1993, Bockstael et
al. 1995, Voinov et al. 1999). To account for the large uncertainties involved, these models would have to be used in a precautionary way, looking for the range of possible values and
erring on the side of caution (Costanza and Perrings 1990).
To fully integrate the three goals of ecological sustainability, social fairness, and economic efficiency, we also need a further step: value formation through public discussion (Sen
1995). This is the essence of real democracy. As Buchanan

(1954) put it: “The definition of democracy as ‘government
by discussion’ implies that individual values can and do
change in the process of decision-making” (p. 120). By limiting our valuations and social decisionmaking to the goal of
economic efficiency based on fixed preferences, we prevent the
needed democratic discussion of values and options and are
left with only the “illusion of choice” (Schmookler 1993).
Rather than trying to avoid the difficult questions raised by
the valuation of ecological systems and services, we need to
acknowledge the broad range of goals being served by such
a discussion, as well as the technical difficulties involved. We
must get on with the process of value formation and analysis in as participatory and democratic a way as possible, but
in a way that also takes advantage of the full range and depth
of scientific information we have accumulated on ecosystem
functioning. This is not simply the application of the conventional preanalytic vision and analysis to a new problem but
something that requires a new, more comprehensive and
integrated preanalytic vision and new, yet-to-be-developed
analyses that will flow from it. This enormously important
challenge awaits the next generation of ecosystem scientists.

Four alternative visions of the future
Not only do our visions of the way the world works change
but our vision of the way we would like the world to be is also
evolving. Elsewhere, I have laid out four broad visions of the
future (Costanza 1999, Costanza 2000). Although the number of possible visions of the future is infinite, I believe these
four visions embody the basic patterns within which much
of this variation occurs. Each of the visions is based on some
critical assumptions about the way the world works, which
may or may not turn out to be true. This format allows one
to clearly identify these assumptions, assess how critical they
are to the relevant vision, and recognize the consequences of
their being wrong.
The four visions derive from two basic world views, whose
characteristics are laid out in Table 2. These world views have
been described in many ways (Bossel 1996), but one fundaJune 2001 / Vol. 51 No. 6  BioScience 463
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mental distinction has to do with one’s degree of faith in
technological progress (Costanza 1989). The “technological
optimist” worldview assumes that technical progress can
solve all future problems. It is a vision of continued expansion of humans and their dominion over nature. This is the
default vision in current Western society, and one that represents continuation of current trends into the indefinite future. It is the “taker” culture as described so eloquently by
Daniel Quinn in Ishmael (1992).
There are two versions of this vision, however. One corresponds to the underlying assumptions on which it is based actually being true in the real world (the positive version), and
the other corresponds to those assumptions being false (the
negative version), as shown in Figure 2. The positive version
of the technological optimist vision I’ll call Star Trek, after the
popular TV series that is its most articulate and vividly
fleshed-out manifestation. The negative version of the technological optimist vision I’ll call Mad Max, after the popular
movie of several years ago that embodies many aspects of this
vision gone bad.
The “technological skeptic” vision is one that depends
much less on technological change and more on social and
community development. It is not in any sense antitechnology, but it does not put blind faith in technology either. The
technological skeptic views technology as the servant of larger
goals and seeks to encourage technologies that have the best
chance of promoting development without irreversibly damaging our natural capital base. The version of this vision that
corresponds to the skeptics being right about the nature of the
world I’ll call “Ecotopia,” after the semipopular book of the
late 1970s (Callenbach 1975). If the optimists turn out to be
right about the real state of the world, what I’ll call the “Big
Government” vision comes to pass—Ronald Reagan’s worst
nightmare of overly protective government policies getting in
the way of the free market and slowing down economic
growth.
Each of these future visions is best described as a narrative
from the perspective of, say, the year 2100. This allows one to
make them more real and vivid. The narratives are, of course,

only caricatures, but they capture the essence of the visions
they represent. I have described these four futures as narratives in detail elsewhere (Costanza 1999, 2000) and here give
only a summary of their main features in Figure 2.

Dealing with uncertainty at the
level of future visions

How should society decide among these four visions? Does
it even need to decide? Why not just let what happens happen, letting people have their own independent vision of the
future as it suits them? Isn’t this the essence of freedom and
democracy—Individuals can pursue their own visions as
they please? If we lived in our own completely isolated worlds
where our actions and decisions had no effect on anyone
else, this might be appropriate. A basic tenet of democracy is
that individual rights are not to be limited unless they impact
the rights of others. But we live in an interconnected world,
which is becoming more interconnected every day as the human population grows. All of our futures are intertwined, and
the actions and decisions of each of us affect everyone else,
both those alive today and those yet to be born. The essence
of democracy in this full-world context is government by
discussion and mutual value formation. The key, as
Yankelovich (1991) suggests, is coming to public judgment
about the major value issues facing society, its goals and visions, and this process can be accelerated by first laying out
the options in the form of relatively well-articulated visions,
as I have attempted above.
We can go further in elaborating the consequences of the
four visions outlined above in an effort to come more quickly
to public judgment. Three of the four visions are “sustainable,”
in the sense that they represent continuation of the current
society (only Mad Max is not), but we need a closer look at
their underlying world views, their critical assumptions, and
the potential costs of those assumptions being wrong.
The world view (and attendant policies) of the Star Trek
vision is unbridled faith in technology and free competition,
and its essential underlying assumption is that resources are
unlimited, particularly cheap energy. The cost of pursuing this
world view and its policies if the assumption of unlimited resources is wrong is
the Mad Max vision. Likewise, the worldTable 2. Some characteristics of two basic worldviews.
view (and attendant policies) of the EcoTechnological
Technological
topia vision is technological skepticism
optimist
skeptic
and communitarianism (the community
comes first), and its essential underlying asTechnical progress can deal with any
Technical progress is limited, and ecological
future challenge
carrying capacity must be preserved
sumptions are that resources are limited
and cooperation pays. The cost of pursuCompetition is guiding principle
Cooperation is guiding principle
ing this worldview and its policies if the asSystems are linear, without
Systems are complex, nonlinear, with
sumption of limited resources is wrong is
discontinuties or irreversibilities
discontinuties and irreversibilities
the Big Government vision, in which a
Humans dominate nature
Humans are in partnership with nature
community-first policy slows down
People are out for themselves
Community comes first
growth relative to the free-market Star
Trek vision. Figure 2 can be viewed as a
Market is guiding principle
Market serves larger goals
payoff matrix, with each of the four cells
in the matrix indicating the “payoff” of
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Worldview and Policies

pursuing the policies of the worldview (on the left) in combination with each real state of the world (on the top).
To rank the elements of the payoff matrix, one would need
to discuss the four visions outlined above with a broad range
of participants and then have them evaluate each vision in
terms of its overall desirability. So far, I’ve conducted a preliminary (nonscientific) survey with 418 participants. The
American participants consisted of 17 students in an ecological economics class at the University of Maryland, 260 attendees at a convocation speech at Wartburg College in Waverly (Iowa), and 39 via the Internet. The Swedish participants
consisted of 71 attendees at a Keynotes in Natural Resources
Lecture at the Swedish University of Agricultural Science, Uppsala, and 31 attendees at a presentation at Stockholm University. The respondents were read the narrative version of each
of the four visions in turn and were then asked the following:
“For each vision, I’d like you to first state, on a scale of –10 to
+10 using the scale provided, how comfortable you would be
living in the world described. How desirable do you find such
a world? I’m not asking you to vote for one vision over the others. Consider each vision independently, and just state how desirable (or undesirable) you would find it if you happened to
find yourself there.” They were also asked to give their age, gender, and household income range on the survey form. The results (mean ± standard deviation) are shown in Table 3,
grouped by country and pooled.
Frequency distributions of the results are plotted in Figure
3. The majority of those surveyed found the Star Trek vision
positive (mean of +2.48 ± 5.13). Given that it represents the
logical extension of the currently dominant worldview and

culture, it is interesting that this vision was rated so low. I had
expected this vision to be rated much higher, and this result
may indicate either the deep ambivalence many people have
about the direction society seems to be headed or the selfselection of respondents, or both. The frequency plot and the
high standard deviation also show this ambivalence toward
Star Trek. The responses span the range from +10 to –10, with
only a weak preponderance toward the positive side of the
scale. This result applied for both the American and Swedish
subgroups.
Those surveyed found the Mad Max vision very negative
at –8.12 (± 3.23); only about 3% of participants rated this vision positive. This was as expected. The Americans seemed a
bit less averse to Mad Max (–7.78 ± 3.41) than the Swedes
(–9.12 ± 2.30) and showed a larger standard deviation.
The Big Government vision was rated on average just positive at 0.97 (± 4.29). Many found it appealing, but some
found it abhorrent, probably because of the limits on individual freedom. Here there were significant differences between
the Americans and Swedes, with the Swedes (+2.32 ± 3.48)
being much more favorably disposed to Big Government
and having a smaller standard deviation than the Americans
(+0.54 ± 4.44). This also was as expected, given the cultural
differences in attitudes toward government in America and
Sweden. Swedes rated Big Government almost as highly as Star
Trek.
Finally, most of those surveyed found the Ecotopia vision
very positive at 5.81 (± 3.97). Some respondents were very positive, some only mildly so, but very few, only about 7% of those
surveyed, expressed a negative reaction to such a world.

environmental problems.
Leisure time increases because robots do most
work.
Humans colonize the solar
system, where population
continues to expand.

develop because of strict
safety standards.

.

Figure 2. Four visions of the future based on two basic worldviews and two alternative states of
the real world.
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Table 3. Results of a survey of desirability of each of the four visions. Desirability was ranked on a scale of –10 (least
desirable) to +10 (most desirable) by self-selected groups of Americans and Swedes. Standard deviations are given in
parentheses after the means.
Americans (n = 316)
Star Trek
Mad Max
Big Government
Ecotopia

+2.38
–7.78
+0.54
+5.32

(±
(±
(±
(±

5.03)
3.41)
4.44)
4.10)

Swedes (n = 102)
+2.48
–9.12
+2.32
+7.33

(±
(±
(±
(±

5.45)
2.30)
3.48)
3.11)

Pooled (n = 418)
+2.48
–8.12
+0.97
+5.81

(±
(±
(±
(±

5.13)
3.23)
4.29)
3.97)

Notes: The Americans consisted of 17 participants in an ecological economics class at the University of Maryland, 260 attendees at a convocation speech at Wartburg College in Waverly, Iowa, 27 January 1998, and 39 via the Internet. The Swedes consisted of 71 attendees at
a Keynotes in Natural Resources Lecture at the Swedish University of Agricultural Science, Uppsala, 20 April 1999 and 31 attendees at a
presentation at Stockholm University, 22 April 1999.
The pooled rankings are used in the discussion, but the conclusions would be the same if using just the American rankings or just the
Swedish rankings. In fact, the conclusions are fairly insensitive to the exact values of the rankings, as long as Big Government is rated
higher than Mad Max, and Star Trek and Ecotopia are rated higher than Big Government.

Swedes rated Ecotopia significantly higher than Americans did,
also as might be expected given cultural differences.
Some other interesting patterns emerge from the survey. All
of the visions had large standard deviations, but the frequency distributions, in particular, show the Mad Max vision
was consistently very negative and the Ecotopia vision was consistently very positive. Age and gender seem to play a minor,
but interesting role in how individuals rated the visions.
Males rated Star Trek higher than females (means of 3.66 and
1.90, respectively; p = 0.0039). Males also rated Mad Max

higher than females (means of –7.11 and –8.20, respectively;
p = 0.0112). The means were not significantly different by gender for either of the other two visions. Age was not significantly
correlated with ranking for any of the visions, but the variance in ranking seemed to decrease somewhat with age, with
younger participants showing a higher range of ratings than
older participants.
Work is in progress to expand this survey and conduct a
random sample of the population, but the general conclusions
are fairly insensitive to the exact results.

Figure 3. Results of vision desirability survey. Responses about the degree of desirability of each of the four future visions are
plotted as frequency distributions. Total number of respondents in each case was 418.
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Worst-case analysis
So, we find ourselves as a species facing the payoff matrix outlined in Figure 2. What do we do? We can choose between the
two worldviews and their attendant policies. Yet we face pure
and irreducible uncertainty concerning the real state of the
world. Who knows whether fusion-based energy or something
equivalent will be invented? Should we choose the Star Trek
vision (and the optimist policies) merely because it is the most
popular or because it is the direction things seem to be heading already?
From the perspective of game theory, this problem has a
fairly definitive answer. This is a game against nature that can
be played only once, and the relative probabilities of each outcome are completely unknown. In addition, we can assume
that society as a whole should be risk averse in this situation.
The numerical rankings on each outcome (from our preliminary survey) make it a bit easier to talk about: Star Trek
is +2.5, Mad Max is –8.1, Big Government is +1.0, and Ecotopia is +5.8. One would look at each row in the matrix
(corresponding to a policy set) and see what the worst outcome is for that policy set. For the optimist policy set, Mad
Max (–8.1) is the worst case. For the skeptical policy set, Big
Government (+1.0) is the worst case. We would then compare the worst cases and choose the policy set with the largest
(most positive) ranking: +1.0 is much larger than –8.1, so we
would choose the skeptic’s policy. This is a standard “minimax regrets” decision rule (Milnor 1964, Rawls 1971, Bishop
1978). Although there has been some controversy in the literature about using this decision rule for situations characterized by extreme uncertainty (Ready and Bishop 1991), a
recent review (Palmini 1999) shows that this rule is unambiguously preferred because it “emphasizes risk-aversion
while explicitly incorporating the opportunity cost of making a ‘wrong’ choice” (p. 463).
If we choose the skeptic’s policy set, the worst thing that can
happen is Big Government, which is much better than the
worst thing that can happen under the optimist’s policy set,
which is Mad Max. The conclusion that we should choose the
skeptic’s policy set is fairly insensitive to the specific values of
the rankings. The rankings would have to change so that either Big Government or Ecotopia was rated worse than Mad
Max to reverse this outcome. In fact, the way the payoff matrix is set up, Mad Max is the one really negative outcome and
the only unsustainable outcome. If one of our major goals as
a society is sustainability, then we should develop policies that
assure us of not ending up in Mad Max, no matter what
happens.
There are also some other considerations in favor of choosing the skeptic’s policies. The skeptical policies are less likely
to close out any options. One could still switch to the optimist’s
policies if the real state of the world were shown to conform
to the optimist’s view. For example, if fusion-based energy or
its equivalent were ever mastered, one could switch to the
Star Trek vision from the Big Government vision. The reverse switch from Mad Max to Ecotopia could not be made as

easily, because the infrastructure would not be present. The
skeptic’s policies are much better at preserving options.
One can also argue that the probabilities of each state of the
world being correct are not completely unknown. If one argued that the prospects for cheap, unlimited, nonpolluting energy were, in fact, very good, then the decision matrix would
have to be weighted with those probabilities. But the complete
dependence of the Star Trek vision on discovering a cheap, unlimited energy source weighs heavily against the probability
of its occurrence.It’s like leaping off the top of the World Trade
Center building and hoping that you can invent a parachute
before you hit the ground. It’s better to wait until you have the
parachute (and have tested it extensively) before you jump.
By adopting the skeptic’s policies, the possibility of this invention is preserved, but without utter dependence on it.

Scientific objectivity, values, and policy
I hope the foregoing discussion has put the theme of this special issue in a new and broader context. To summarize:
· There is no such thing as scientific objectivity, be-

cause all science must be (1) based on a preanalytic
vision that is inherently subjective and (2) judged for
utility and quality against criteria that are inherently
subjective. We can, however, be very clear about the
distinction between the vision and values component
of the process and the analysis component built on
that vision.
· The quality of scientific work can thus be judged

based on its adherence to the preanalytic vision and
its pragmatic utility in modeling the real world, as
tested against the general criteria developed by the
scientific community. We can judge between “good”
science and “bad” science according to these subjectively determined criteria of quality, but it is not really honest or useful to use objectivity as a yardstick.
· Subjective values also enter the discussion when we

talk about how we would like the world to be. This
aspect of future visions strongly determines which
set of current policies are most appropriate, given
our huge level of uncertainty about the real state of
the world.
· The major source of uncertainty about our current

environmental policies is at this level of visions and
worldviews, not in the details of analysis or implementation within a particular vision. By laying out
four alternative future histories of the Earth, the critical assumptions and uncertainties underlying each
vision can be more easily seen and a rational policy
can be set to assure sustainability.
· A cooperative, precautionary policy set that assumes

limited resources is the most rational and resilient
course in the face of fundamental uncertainty about
the limits of technology.
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